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Abstract
Vajda and Buttya´n proposed several lightweight
authentication protocols for authenticating RFID
tags to readers, and left open the quantifiable cryp-
tographic strength. Our cryptanalysis answers this
open question by implementing and measuring at-
tacks against their XOR and SUBSET protocols. A
passive eavesdropper can impersonate a tag in the
XOR protocol after observing only 70 challenge-
response transactions between the tag and reader.
In contrast, the theoretical maximum strength of the
XOR protocol could have required 16! ∗ 2 observed
transactions to break the key. Our experiments also
show that a passive eavesdropper can recover the
shared secret used in the XOR protocol by observ-
ing an expected 1,092 transactions. Additionally,
a nearly optimal active attack against the SUBSET
protocol extracts almost one bit of information for
each bit emitted by the tag.
1 Introduction
Low-cost RFID tags are being increasingly used
in widespread applications such as inventory con-
trol, transit systems, livestock management, and
building access. Cryptography is needed to pre-
vent unauthorized communication between tags and
readers. Vajda and Buttya´n [3] developed sev-
eral lightweight cryptographic protocols for low-
cost tags. We show that their XOR and SUBSET
protocols provide inadequate protection from pas-
sive and active adversaries.
1.1 Background
For their XOR protocol, Vajda and Buttya´n [3]
detail a possible passive attack that involves guess-
ing the session keys by a brute force attack af-
ter observing two consecutive runs of the proto-
col. The attacker is able to learn the difference
between consecutive session keys and forumlate
guesses on the subsequent session keys. In approx-
imately 1/16th of the cases, the session key will
have a special property. Our attack exploits certain
statistical properties of the bitstring and determines
the correct key value with high probability.
Vajda and Buttya´n present an active attack
against their SUBSET protocol, which requires
more than 256 queries for their parameters. We
detail an active attack that requires only 9 queries
under the same parameters. The attacker sends the
tag a specifically formatted query and sends a sub-
sequent query formulated based on the previous re-
sponse. We also present a passive attack that will
recover all bits with exponentially high probability.
Grain [2] is a lightweight stream cipher that was
designed for hardware applications with restricted
resources, such as memory and power consump-
tion, and may be suitable for use in RFID tags. [1]
presents a cryptanalysis of Grain that recovers the
80-bit key.
2. Vajda and Buttya´n Protocol 1
Protocol 1 in Figure 1 is a challenge-response
protocol in which the tag and reader share a secret,
k(0). To construct a challenge, the reader selects a
bitstring x uniformly at random. The reader trans-
mits a(i) = x(i) ⊕ k(i) to the tag, where i is the
ith transaction between the reader and tag. k(i) is
calculated by a permutation of k(0). Because x(i)
is random, a(i) is also random. In an information-
theoretic sense, a(i) reveals nothing about the secret
k(0).
The tag uses its knowledge of k(i) to extract
x(i). The tag then responds to the reader with
b(i) = x(i)⊕k(0). Knowing x(i) and k(0), the reader
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Figure 1. Steps 1-4 of VB protocol 1. The tag knows k(0) and the permutation to calculate
k(i). The tag extracts x(i) from the challenge to form a valid response. Steps 2a and 3a
show how an active adversary can implement the Repeated Keys Attack to successfully
impersonate a tag. Mallory knows k(i−2)⊕k(0) after observing a challenge/response pair
from an earlier transaction between the reader and tag. In this example, the session key
is repeated every 2 cycles. Thus, k(i−2) = k(i), and Mallory can form a valid response
without knowing x(i), k(i), or k(0).
can verify the correctness of the tag’s response.
The protocol is considered broken when an ad-
versary can send a valid b(i) = x(i) ⊕ k(0) or learn
the value of k(0). [3] notes that a passive attacker
can learn k(i) ⊕ k(i+1) after observing two consec-
utive transactions of the protocol. However, they
suggest that an attacker must use a brute force at-
tack to guess the session key k(i) and completely
break the protocol, which requires as many as 16!∗2
guesses, for the 128-bit example.
We demonstrate two types of attacks against Pro-
tocol 1. First is an active attack based on key se-
quence cycles that obtains the value x(i) ⊕ k(0) and
can successfully impersonate a tag after observing
an average of 70 transactions. The second attack is
independent of key cycles and can fully recover k(0)
in 1092 expected guesses.
2.1 Implementation
We implemented the 128-bit key length exam-
ple from [3] and generated 1,000 sessions with
10,000 transactions per session, i.e. we generated
1,000 different k(0) values and permuted each one
10,000 times. Figure 2 shows that the session keys
k(1), . . . , k(i), . . . , k(10,000) cycle after an average
of 68 permutations. That is, the permutation re-
sulted in a repeating pattern of session keys after
an average of 68 sessions. For a cycle period of c,
k(i) = k(i+c). The average cycle period is 2, mean-
ing that k(i) = k(i+2). The minimum cycle period
was 1, which occurred in 31.9% of our results. All
of the observed keys eventually repeat, and the max-
imum cycle period was 36, which occurred in only
1 out of the 1,000 sessions.
Session key cycles lead to our first attack, which
allows an active adversary to successfully imper-
sonate a tag. We also developed an active and pas-
sive attack that, independent of session key cycles,
allows an adversary to gain full knowledge of k(0).
2.2 Repeated Keys Attack
An active adversary, Mallory, can learn k(i) ⊕
k(0) after observing one challenge/response pair.
As shown in Figure 1, Mallory learns a(i) = x(i) ⊕
k(i) and b(i) = x(i) ⊕ k(0), and can calculate their
bitwise difference to learn k(i) ⊕ k(0). He builds a
table with k(i)⊕k(0), k(i+1)⊕k(0), k(i+2)⊕k(0), . . .
rows. Two rows will have the same value when
the session key repeats, allowing the attacker to
determine the key cycle period. Without loss of
generality, assume that the key cycle period is 2.
Thus, k(i−2) = k(i). As Figure 1 shows, when the
reader sends x(i) ⊕ k(i), the attacker can calculate
(x(i) ⊕ k(i))⊕ (k(i−2) ⊕ k(0)) = x(i) ⊕ k(0). This
forms a valid response which the attacker can then
broadcast to the reader, thus successfully imperson-
ating a valid tag.
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Figure 2. This histogram shows that keys repeat much earlier than the 16!∗2 theoretical
maximum. 1,000 instances of the VB protocol 1 with random K(0)’s execute until a key
repeats. A key repeats on average after 68 transactions between a tag and reader.
In 68.8% of the sessions we generated, the key
cycle period is 2 or less. If the attacker begins
eavesdropping with the first transaction between the
reader and tag, he can detect a repeated key cy-
cle and impersonate a tag after 70 transactions. If
the adversary begins eavesdropping after 68 trans-
actions, then, on average, he can impersonate the
tag after observing just 3 transactions.
2.3 Nibble Attack
Passive attack: [3] gives an example using 128-
bit key lengths. The permutation Π(k(i)) = k(i+1)
is defined as follows. First cut each byte of k(i)
in half to obtain two nibbles. The left nibbles
k
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Observe that if k(i)0,L = 0, then the first four bits
of k(i) are equal to 0. The 0th and the k(i)0,L
th
ele-
ments of k(i)0,R are switched. Hence, k
(i)
0,R = k
(i+1)
0,R
and the permutation Π resulted in no change to
k
(i)
0,R, and thus we know that k
(i)
0,L = 0. This event
will happen for roughly a 1/16th-fraction of values
i. Knowing k(i)0,L = 0, we can compute x
(i)
0,L and
therefore k(0)0,L.
As noted in [3], it is possible for a passive adver-
sary to learn k(i) ⊕ k(i+1) after observing two con-
secutive runs of the protocol. Mallory constructs a
table as in Figure 3 and looks at the Indicator col-
umn for ‘0000’ in the second nibble. When this oc-
curs, he knows that k(i)0,R = k
(i+1)
0,R because their
bitwise difference is ‘0000.’ Thus, he also knows
that k(i)0,L = 0. He can use column 1 to calculate
x
(i)
0,L and then use column 2 to determine k
(0)
0,L.
Using similar reasoning, he can find rows in the
Indicator column where the fourth nibble is ‘0000,’
which indicates that k(i)1,R = k
(i+1)
1,R . Thus k
(i)
1,L = 1
and he can use the table to calculate k(0)1,L. We can
use this reasoning to find all nibbles of k(0)L and k
(0)
R
and learn the full value of k(0), thus breaking the
scheme completely.
Active attack: Our passive attack algorithm can
also be employed as an active attack. Mallory
first sends the tag a string of 0′s. When a tag
receives a challenge a(i), it always responds with
a(i)⊕k(i)⊕k(0). Thus Mallory will learn k(i)⊕k(0)
by sending a challenge of all 0′s to the tag. He
can continue to sends challenges of all 0′s to learn
k(i+1) ⊕ k(0), k(i+2) ⊕ k(0), etc. and construct a
table similar to Figure 3. The same analysis from
the passive attack can be employed to determine the
full value of k(0).
Remark We note that there are cases in which a
nibble is swapped twice, such that k(i)0,R = k
(i+1)
0,R
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R → T T → R Leak Indicator
x(i) ⊕ k(i) x(i) ⊕ k(0) k(i) ⊕ k(0) k(i−1) ⊕ k(i)
x(i+1) ⊕ k(i+1) x(i+1) ⊕ k(0) k(i+1) ⊕ k(0) k(i) ⊕ k(i+1)
x(i+2) ⊕ k(i+2) x(i+2) ⊕ k(0) k(i+2) ⊕ k(0) k(i+1) ⊕ k(i+2)
Figure 3. Information Leaked by Protocol 1. The first and second columns are the
observed challenge and response, respectively. The Leak column is the bitwise differ-
ence between the first two columns, and the Indicator column is the bitwise difference
between rows in the Leak column. When our algorithm finds a ‘0000’ nibble in the In-
dicator column, it combines this with information from the Leak column to calculate a
nibble of k(0).
and k(i)0,L 6= 0. Thus, Mallory needs to find two
cases with a ‘0000’ nibble. If the values calculated
for k(0)0,L agree, then this is the correct value with
high probability. Otherwise, he must find a third
nibble and take the majority value. A false positive
occurs in 115 cases, because the ‘0000’ actually oc-
curs in one of the other 15 positions. Mallory must
find two ‘0000’ nibbles (16 expected trials to find
each) and find a third in 115 +
1
15 of the cases. This
results in 32 ∗ (16 + 16 + 16 ∗ ( 115 + 115 )) = 1092
expected trials to fully recover all 32 nibbles of k(0).
3 Vajda and Buttya´n Protocol 2
Protocol 2 is a challenge-response protocol in
which the tag and reader share two secrets, kL and
kR.
To construct a challenge, the reader selects two
bitstrings x and y uniformly at random. The reader
transmits a = x⊕kL and b = y⊕kR to the tag. Be-
cause x and y are random, a and b are also random.
In an information-theoretic sense, the pair (a, b) re-
veals nothing about the secrets kL and kR.
The secrets kL and kR effectively act as “masks”
to conceal the challenge values x and y. The tag
uses its knowledge of kL and kR to extract x =
Reader Tag
a = x⊕ kL
b = (y1 ⊕ kR,1) || . . . || (ym ⊕ kR,m)
c = x[y1], x[y2], . . . , x[ym]
Figure 4. VB protocol 2
a ⊕ kL and y = b ⊕ kR. The tag then responds to
the reader with selected portions of x indexed by y,
as detailed below. Knowing x and y, the reader can
verify the correctness of the tag’s response.
While a challenge alone in this protocol leaks no
information, a challenge-response pair does leak a
considerable amount. Vajda and Buttya´n note this
leakage, but hypothesize that it is about one bit
per protocol invocation. They suggest, therefore,
that their challenge-response protocol may be suit-
able for practical scenarios in which hundreds of ac-
cesses to a tag are impractical for an attacker.
We demonstrate an active attack against Protocol
2 that recovers kL and kR almost optimally, in the
sense that the attack extracts nearly one bit of infor-
mation from every bit emitted by the tag. In other
words, the security of Protocol 2 is nearly no better
than that of a protocol in which the tag directly re-
veals a portion of its key in response to a challenge.
Protocol details: Let l and m be security param-
eters. The secret kL has bit-length l, a power of 2.
The other secret, kR, has bit-length m log2 l. Let
kR = kR,1 ‖ . . . ‖ kR,m, i.e., we partition the
secret intom substrings, each of bit-length log2 l.
As we have explained, x and y are random bit
strings. By analogy with our notation for kR, let
y = y1 ‖ . . . ‖ ym. A challenge consists of a pair
(a = x ⊕ kL, b = y ⊕ kR). The response of the
tag comprises selected bits of x; the tag determines
which bits of x to return to the reader by treating
y1, ...ym as indices into x. Let x[i] denote the ith
bit of x for 0 ≤ i ≤ log2 l (with either big-endian
or little-endian notation). See Figure 4 for a concise
protocol specification.
Overview of active attack: Vajda and Buttya´n
describe an active attack involving l queries to the
4
tag that recovers kL. We refer the reader to [3] for
details. As an example, they consider l = 256 and
m = 16. They hypothesize that an active attacker
requires at leastS 256 queries to break their scheme.
We show that considerably fewer queries suffice.
The active attack that we describe first recovers
kR in log2 l + 1 queries—9 queries for the sug-
gested parameters l = 256 and m = 16. The at-
tack then fully recovers kL with at most dl/me ad-
ditional queries—i.e., 16 queries for the suggested
parameters in [3], amounting to a total of 25 queries
for the full attack.
The attack is nearly optimal in the following
sense. The total bit length of the shared secrets
kR and kL is D = l + m log2 l, while our at-
tack involves a total bit output from the tag of
(dl/me + log2 l + 1)m ≤ D + 2m bits. Viewed
another way, our attack is optimal to within two
queries—and only one query when l is divisible by
m. (The attack could be further optimized some-
what, but the gains would be small, of course.)
Attack details: Let us denote by a(j), b(j), and
c(j) the protocol values in the jth query, for j =
0, 1, . . . , log2 l. Let c(j)[i] denote the ith bit of the
tag response.
The attack is as follows. Let j′ = log2 l− j. We
construct the vector a(j) as a sequence of 2j
′
‘0’
bits, followed by 2j
′
‘1’ bits, then 2j
′
‘0’ bits, etc.,
up to the full length of l bits. In other words, we let
a(0) = 00 . . . 00, i.e., the all-0s string. We let a(1) =
00 . . . 0011 . . . 11, i.e., the first half consists of 0s,
then second half of 1s. The final query, a(log2 l),
consists of alternating ‘0’ and ‘1’ bits.
For all j, we let b(j) = ~0, i.e., b is a string of 0
bits. (This is a matter of convenience. It is easy to
modify the attack such that b is any desired value in
any query.) In query q, we challenge the tag with
the pair (a(j), b(j)).
Since b(j) = ~0, for any i, we have yi = kR,i.
Therefore, c[i] = x[kR,i]. Now observe that for any
0 ≤ i ≤ log2 l, if the leading bit kR,i[0] = 0, then
c(0)[i] = c(1)[i], since kR,i indexes the first half of
the vector a, which is constant across the 0th and
1st queries. Otherwise c(0)[i] 6= c(1)[i]. Similarly,
if kR,i[1] = 0, then we observe c(0)[i] = c(2)[i];
otherwise c(0)[i] 6= c(2)[i]. Similar comparisons
across queries reveal the remaining bits of kR,i.
Thus, for any i, log2 l+ 1 queries suffice to recover
kR,i in its entirety. Furthermore, we may recover
kR,i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m independently in parallel.
Hence, with log2 l + 1 queries, we may recover kR
completely.
With knowledge of kR, we can quickly recover
kL. Suppose (a, b, c) is a given challenge-response
tuple. Using kR, we can create a value b that cor-
responds to any sequence of indices y1, . . . , ym we
desire. We know that c[i] = x[yi]. Therefore, c[i] =
a[yi] ⊕ kL[yi], and hence kL[yi] = a[yi] ⊕ c[i]. In
other words, by setting b as desired and using a ran-
dom vector a, we may recover anym desired bits in
kL. Thus, dl/me queries suffices to recover all of
xL.
Remark: The authors propose a method of
strengthening their scheme by using linear combi-
nations of overlapping sets of y to select bits from
x. Our hypothesis is that any such scheme would
still not provide adequate cryptographic strength for
most practical settings.
4 Conclusion
The Vajda and Buttya´n protocols 1 and 2 have in-
herent weaknesses that render them inadequate for
tag authentication. With few resources, an attacker
can determine the session keys for both of the pro-
tocols, breaking the schemes completely.
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